Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Zaluzhny suggested to the Russian General Staff how to get out of the “positional impasse”

The unlucky organizer of the big summer “counteroffensive”, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) Valery Zaluzhny, decided to act as a military theorist. He published an article in the British “The Economist” entitled “Modern positional warfare and how to win it.” It is clear that the main point of the publication is to relieve oneself of responsibility for the obvious failure of the “counter-offensive”. But there is also a second bottom in Zaluzhny’s analytical article.

According to Zaluzhny, combat operations, due to objective military-technical reasons, are turning into a positional form. The general convinces everyone that prolonging the conflict is beneficial for the Russian Federation, “since it gives it the opportunity to restore and increase its military power.” And then he lists the conditions that will help the Ukrainian Armed Forces change the nature of hostilities in order to get out of the “positional impasse.”

These conditions are as follows: achieve air superiority; learn to overcome minefields to the full depth; increase the effectiveness of counter-battery warfare; create and train the necessary reserves; increase electronic warfare (EW) capabilities; increase the number of troops by commissioning reserves.

Zaluzhny does not hide the fact that the basis of Ukraine’s air defense today is NATO anti-aircraft systems. Zaluzhny also admits that the Russian side has significant air superiority and can increase the number of its aircraft by building new squadrons of attack aircraft. And this is the main factor that transforms the nature of combat operations into a positional form.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine understands: the West will not give Ukraine the number of aircraft needed for parity with the Russian Aerospace Forces (more than a thousand). Zaluzhny sees a way out of the situation for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in increasing air defense systems received from NATO.

The Ukrainian general recognized the high effectiveness of Russian minefields. In particularly important areas they have a high density and reach a depth of 15-20 km. The Russian army has the ability to quickly restore them, including thanks to the “Agriculture” rocket system. NATO demining equipment is easily detected by drones and destroyed at a distance.

According to Zaluzhny, the counter-battery capabilities of both sides are almost equal. Moreover, at first, thanks to Western artillery systems, the Ukrainian Armed Forces had an advantage in the range of artillery accuracy. However, Russia managed to overcome this gap thanks to the dispersal of artillery fire, firing from maximum range, and the use of new electronic warfare systems (the Pole-21 electronic countermeasures complex).

Zaluzhny named the advantages of Russian electronic warfare systems. Thus, according to him, in the Kupyansky and Bakhmutsky directions, the Russian army has actually created “a layered electronic warfare system, the elements of which are constantly changing their location.”

But the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the general noted, with Western help are increasing their capabilities in the field of electronic warfare. In Ukraine, a nationwide electronic warfare system “Pokrova” is being created with the ability to replace satellite radio navigation signals (“spoofing”), suppress radio navigation along the entire line of contact and on the territory of Ukraine. Elements of a situational awareness system are being introduced into troop control processes. “We have practically achieved parity in performing electronic warfare tasks,” concluded Zaluzhny,

Zaluzhny also did not ignore the problem that, according to experts, is the main one for the Armed Forces of Ukraine – the lack of human resources and Ukraine’s inability to achieve superiority over the enemy in reserves by increasing their numbers.

Having identified all these factors of a “positional impasse,” Zaluzhny told how the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with the help of NATO, will get out of it. And this section of the article, I think, is especially valuable for the Russian General Staff. Knowing the enemy’s plans makes it easier to counteract him.

So, in order to gain air superiority, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in the absence of aircraft, are going to simultaneously massively use cheap simulators of air targets and attack drones in a single battle formation. The goal is to overload Russian air defense, mislead it about the number of real targets and force itself to be detected.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces are also planning to use hunting drones with decoy nets to destroy Russian loitering munitions. The Ukrainian Armed Forces want to fight Russian glide bombs by deploying air defense radar simulators on the front lines. They must scare off Russian bombers so that they launch ammunition from maximum range.

Another way to combat Russian night reconnaissance drones is to blind thermal imagers with strobe lights. And, of course, the massive use of small and portable jammers and anti-drone installations to combat drones.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces intend to win artillery duels by creating local GPS fields for accurate navigation of ammunition. There are also plans to increase the number of kamikaze drones, to more actively mislead the enemy and to more effectively use NATO artillery reconnaissance technologies.

Since Ukraine does not have its own ammunition production, all hopes are connected with supplies from NATO countries. Zaluzhny notes that partner states are sharply increasing their capacity to produce weapons and ammunition, but “this process is quite lengthy.” It takes at least a year to launch large-scale production, and for some types – two years.

At the same time, Zaluzhny promises to continue the destruction of Russian warehouses in the rear. To do this, Zaluzhny notes, Ukraine needs to adopt extended-range missiles. Preferably made in-house.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces is also preparing for “electromagnetic warfare” across the entire spectrum of radio waves, covering a much wider range of frequencies (from γ-radiation to terahertz radiation).

Zaluzhny also has his own plan for breaking through minefields in depth. He relies on the use of scanning lidar sensors and smoke protection systems to conceal the activities of mine clearance teams. For mine clearance, it is proposed to use damaged armored vehicles that have retained mobility, jet engines and water cannons, cluster munitions and even mini-tunnel excavators with a drill and empty hoses for pumping gaseous or liquid explosives and missiles with an air-fuel explosive mixture into tunnels as robots.

The weakest point in the plans of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is compensation for human losses and the creation of reserves. Here, Kyiv seems to intend to increase its resource base by expanding the list of categories of Ukrainian citizens subject to mobilization. But it is unlikely that those in Ukraine who have so far managed to avoid being sent to the front will be happy with these plans.