Who does the labor front work for – Economics – Kommersant
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Capital—whether human or financial—has a habit of fleeing when threatened. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict prompted a mass exodus from the Russian Federation not only of some abstract international or domestic business, but also of quite real labor resources, people and their money. The policy of the Russian authorities towards emigrants, many of whom are still trying to work for the Russian economy, is becoming increasingly controversial. Meanwhile, the recipient countries of the Russians and their resources are more likely to support, sometimes receiving billions of dollars and increasing the rate of GDP growth.
How many people exactly left Russia during 2022, what age, specialties, social status – is still unknown even approximately. In early September, Rosstat reported that by that time 419,000 people had left the country for one purpose or another, with a net outflow of 96,000 people (in 2021, over the same period, there was a net inflow of 113,000 people, with 202,000 . left).
But by themselves, these figures mean little, since it is impossible to isolate real migration flows from them. Yes, and the statistics are given before the start of mobilization, which gave the main impetus to the flight of young, able-bodied men, often with their families. Independent demographer Aleksey Raksha speaks about the range of estimates of the number of citizens who left the Russian Federation in 2022, from 450 thousand to 800 thousand people: “We may never know exactly how many left, how many returned or will return.”
And those are far away
The lack of adequate statistics does not allow experts and businessmen to even approximately estimate the total losses of Russian business from personnel leakage. Most often, Kommersant’s interlocutors simply quote Natalya Zubarevich, professor at the Faculty of Geography of Moscow State University: “The outflow of human capital will be a powerful and long blow to the Russian economy.” Half of the companies participating in a November survey by the Yegor Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy expect production to decline even with sufficient demand growth due to a shortage of staff who left the country due to departure from the country or mobilization.
The shortage of personnel that existed in the Russian Federation even before the outbreak of hostilities due to the demographic failure of the late 1990s and early 2000s prevents the complete replacement of the lost specialists. According to the head of the analytical department of HeadHunter Natalya Danina, the number of Russians aged 20-24 barely exceeds 7 million people – 1.7 times less than in 2012.
To all appearances, neither the state nor business has a systematic answer to the question of how to return those who have left the country and keep those who leave.
In the spring, officials began with persuasion, promises and gingerbread. But quickly enough, the whip appeared in the rhetoric, giving rise to clashes between approaches and branches of power.
Before the State Duma, for example, announced the need to ban the remote work of IT specialists in a number of industries, Maksut Shadayev, head of the Ministry of Digital Development, hastened to explain that this idea would only scare away Russian developers. According to him, there are about 100 thousand specialists abroad, of which 80% work remotely for Russian companies: it will be difficult to find a replacement, and there is already a shortage of personnel in the market.
In July, the Ministry of Finance developed a draft law on increasing personal income tax from 13% to 30% for employees of Russian companies working from abroad. But already in the fall, the ministry backpedaled, talking about the maximum increase in personal income tax up to 15%. However, it’s too early to exhale – at the end of the year, State Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin announced that they were working on increasing taxes for those who had left.
Double growth
Where and for whom is the labor capital that left Russia now working? The main directions of relocation are well known – Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan. But even if they were base points of departure, further migration flows are difficult to trace. But we can, for example, note the economic successes of the same Armenia and Georgia this year.
According to the Armenian Migration Service, about 780,000 Russian citizens entered the country in January-September, and by mid-autumn, about 40,000 Russians remained there for a long time, which is approximately 1.3% of the population. In Georgia, according to various estimates, there may be 130-140 thousand Russians, which is equivalent to 3.5-3.7% of the country’s population.
According to Bloomberg, by December, the Armenian dram appreciated against the dollar by 20%, the Georgian lari by 16%, and the influx of Russians and their money was far from the last factor.
According to the information of the Central Bank of Armenia, cited by Bloomberg, in January-October, $2.8 billion was transferred from the Russian Federation to the country. Armenian Finance Minister Tigran Khachatryan said in mid-December that according to the results of three quarters, “growth in economic activity” amounted to 14.1%, GDP increased by 12.6% (in 2021 – by 5.7%). For 2023, the official expects GDP growth of 13.2%. In Russia, in January-September, GDP fell by 1.6%, by the end of the year a decline of 2.5-3% is expected.
According to economist Haykaz Fanyan, the restaurant and hotel business, retail trade, and the real estate market are growing in Armenia first of all. Armenia is also popular as a direction for the relocation of entire businesses, especially those related to information technology: back in 2015, local authorities exempted IT companies from income tax, and reduced income tax for their employees.
According to the Bank of Georgia, $1.75 billion was transferred to this country from Russia from January to November (4.7 times more year on year), and the first wave is clearly visible, from April to June ($678 million), and “post-mobilization” — from September to November ($790 million). In November 2021, transfers from Russia accounted for only 16.6% of all transfers to Georgia, in November 2022 – already 60.66%. The total inflow of funds increased 1.5 times. For the fourth quarter alone, the Parliament of Georgia twice adjusted the 2022 budget, each time improving the economic growth forecast: first in October from 6% to 8.5%, then in December to 10%. In Georgia, as in Armenia, one of the segments that showed growth after the arrival of Russian relocators was real estate. According to Colliers Georgia, over the year, demand in the country for new buildings in the middle price segment in the country doubled, and in the premium segment it increased by 167%.
High dilution rate
Much less noticeable on the overall scale of the economy, but impressive in absolute terms, was the flow of Russians to Kazakhstan. According to the Minister of Labor and Social Protection of the country, Tamara Dyuisenova, out of a total of 400,000 Russians who entered Kazakhstan since the beginning of 2022, 100,000 people remained in the country by the end of November. This is approximately 0.5% of its population.
The growth of remittances from Russia was also observed in Kazakhstan. According to Ranking.kz’s calculations, based on data from the country’s National Bank, about $662 million came from the Russian Federation in January-October, which is 6.7 times more year-on-year, but still several times less than revenues to Armenia and Georgia.
The impact of Russian immigration on the GDP of Kazakhstan is also imperceptible: in 2021 it grew by 4%, the forecast for 2022 is 2.3-2.8%. Not surprisingly, in absolute terms, the country’s GDP (about $190 billion in 2021) is an order of magnitude greater than that of Armenia ($13.8 billion) and Georgia ($18.7 billion). So far, visiting Russians have no chance to seriously change it. Former adviser to the head of the National Bank of Kazakhstan, Aidarkhan Kusainov, is sure that the economy of the country, which is “embedded in the world gas and oil market,” is much more noticeably affected by its conjuncture than the influx of relocators.
For two other popular departure destinations – Turkey and the United Arab Emirates – there is even less data, although in these countries, residence permits are issued for Russians in a simplified manner. Some idea can be gleaned from the assessments of real estate consultants. So, according to Kalinka, from January to October 2022, Russians concluded 11.3 thousand transactions in Turkey, and 10.6 thousand in Dubai. But the number of Russian relocators who rent rather than buy housing is probably higher.
It is even more naive to expect a serious impact of the emigration of people and the relocation of businesses on these economies than in the case of Kazakhstan. Turkey’s GDP exceeds $800 billion, the UAE – $350 billion. But at the same time, the wealthiest Russians and large businesses are moving in the latter direction, bringing with them quite tangible investments in the form of development projects, new restaurants and banks.
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