What does the sharp acceleration in the production of military equipment lead to?

In the fall of 1936, German intelligence prepared a review of the state of the Soviet aircraft industry and the Red Army Air Force; The extent to which the data presented in it corresponded to reality can be judged by the information collected by military prosecutors and sent to the leadership of the USSR two years later, on October 15, 1938.

From the report “Aircraft fleet and the state of aircraft manufacturing in the Soviet Union as of November 1, 1936,” November 10, 1936.

USSR Air Force on 1.11. With. g. consisted of the following combat vehicles:

reconnaissance aircraft – 2563

fighters – 2466

light bombers – 942

heavy bombers – 484

attack aircraft – 368

amphibians – 35…

Training aircraft are not included here.

90% of named aircraft and 70% of engines are manufactured at Russian aircraft factories. Some aircraft, engines and precision measuring instruments are copied from foreign products.

The Air Force Command generally adheres to a system of copying foreign designs, sometimes in modified form.

In the USSR there are more than 50 aviation industry enterprises, the first place among which in terms of productivity and equipment is occupied by aircraft plant No. 1 in Moscow, the former Dux factory. The plant is located near the Oktyabrsky Field, the central airport and the aircraft depot. Among other Moscow aircraft factories, the Red Air Force also supplies state aircraft factories No. 2, 4, 5, 6, 8. In addition, individual experimental aircraft are produced by the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute TsAGI, and precision measuring instruments are produced by the Aviapribor plant; aircraft propellers – the Propeller plant, etc. In second place is Leningrad, where aviation enterprises producing hydroaviation equipment, as well as aviation schools, are mainly concentrated. Aircraft production is especially developed at the Leningrad State Aviation Plant No. 3. The centers of the aviation industry in the south are Odessa, Kharkov and Kyiv…

It must be emphasized that the aviation industry in the USSR operates on domestic raw materials. Semi-finished products and products from numerous Russian factories, such as canvas, aluminum, duralumin, solid-drawn steel pipes, steel cables, cloth, percale, varnish and paints – all these are products of our own production. The same goes for motors and other parts that are manufactured locally. Only as an exception do they resort to foreign orders for specialized equipment, precision measuring instruments and materials…

Drawings of foreign aircraft usually come through political representations and other Russian bodies abroad. Sometimes technical calculations of individual models are made and sent to the USSR, where they are copied. Then the planes and engines are put into mass production.

A characteristic feature of Russian aircraft is that their workmanship is not very high quality. This applies to a greater extent to mass-produced aircraft. One-piece specimens naturally constitute an exception. The best aircraft are considered to be those from state aircraft factories 1, 2 and 3 in Moscow and Leningrad…

From the report of the USSR Prosecutor A. Ya. Vyshinsky to the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR V. M. Molotov, October 15, 1938.

The Military Prosecutor’s Office has established that a large number of aircraft are not provided with spare parts.

This is also confirmed by the data of the Head of the Department of Mathematics. those. supply of the Red Army Air Force, according to which for 8 months of 1938 the NKOP (People’s Commissariat of Defense Industry) factories.— “Story”) order completed only:

1. for spare parts R-5, R-zet, I-15 (plant No. 1) for 33% of the 8-month plan

2. for spare parts for I-16, UTI-4 (plant No. 21) by 63%

3. for spare parts SB, TB-3 (plant No. 22) by 29%

4. for spare parts U-2 (plant No. 23) by 62%

5. for radiators (plant No. 34) by 66%

6. with metal screws. (plant 1 comb. 150) by 55%

7. on wheels (plant No. 120) by 60%

Repeated requests from the Red Army Air Forces Department to fulfill orders on time did not produce the necessary results.

All documents on this matter, according to the report of the Air Force of the Red Army in the 1st Main Directorate of the NKOP, are filed with the case even without a response.

There is evidence that plant directors view the production of spare parts as a “forced assortment” and, under all sorts of pretexts, delay the fulfillment of their contractual obligations.

Meanwhile, the need for spare parts is increasingly increasing. Demand is especially growing due to the inferiority of aircraft produced by factories in the following parts:

a) on SB aircraft: tanks are leaking, landing gear shock-absorbing struts, landing gear lift hydraulic system hoses, rudder brackets are flying;

b) for the I-16 aircraft: massive leakage of gas tanks, rapid development of hinge joints and controls, weak crutch, cracks in the 4th rib assemblies, etc.

Factories know about all these defects, but do not take measures to eliminate them…

Publication by Evgeny Zhirnov