Two-thirds of Russians who left after the start of the SVO left domestic companies

Two-thirds of Russians who left the country after February 24, 2024 and worked in domestic companies left them during this time. At the same time, after a serious drop by September 2022, the income level of emigrants has not recovered. This follows from the results of a study by the OutRush project, within which sociologists surveyed more than 10 thousand Russian emigrants in March 2022, September 2022 and May-July 2023. At the same time, emigrants do not lose touch with their homeland – about 90% continue to be interested in Russian politics, although they have reduced their civic and political activity.

The OutRush research project dedicated to Russian emigration (bringing together an international team of scientists from academic and analytical institutions) was founded in March 2022 by sociologists Emil Kamalov and Ivetta Sergeeva (European University Institute, Florence). During this time, sociologists conducted three waves of surveys – in March 2022, September 2022 and May-July 2023. The methodology includes in-depth interviews, panel research (regular survey of the same respondents), as well as a survey of new participants – 10,871 respondents from more than 100 countries. The authors do not guarantee that the sample represents all emigrants who left Russia after February 24, 2022, attributing this to the lack of reliable statistical information. However, they explain, the results of the project are “consistent with other studies on Russian emigrants.”

In particular, OutRush researchers concluded that by the summer of 2023, the number of Russians working in domestic companies who left the country had decreased to 13%. Before leaving, 43% of respondents worked in them, in September 2022 – 17%. At the same time, after a serious drop by September 2022, the level of income of Russian emigrants has not recovered. Income stabilization is recorded among the poorest respondents, while the incomes of the richest continue to decline. The unemployment rate among those who left is not growing.

Researchers noted a change in the level of trust of emigrants in the citizens and authorities of the host country. Trust in the former reached 86% compared to spring and autumn 2022 (81%), while the level of trust in governments fell in September 2022 from 66% to 53% and has not changed since then. The highest percentage of people who trust the government is recorded in Germany – 85% and Armenia (68%). In Serbia, the percentage of respondents who trust the authorities was 53%, Israel – 46%, Georgia – 27%, Turkey – 20%: “The low level of trust in Georgia is due to the policies of the current government led by the Georgian Dream party.” The decision of the Turkish authorities not to extend or issue visas and residence permits to Russians also had a negative impact.” The average level of trust in the governments of other countries was 56%.

During the May-July 2023 survey, researchers asked respondents for the first time about their identity and found out which communities they belonged to (multiple answers could be given). Thus, 53% said that they consider themselves part of the community of their compatriots abroad, 31% – citizens of the world, 25% – only part of their family and loved ones, 21% – part of the “Russia of the future”, 20% – part of Europeans, 18% – part of the host country, 14% – part of Russia. Another 15% said they felt isolated.

An important component of “reconstructing identity,” the researchers note, is learning the local language—about half of the respondents do this. However, the desire to integrate into the society of the host country and the relatively high percentage of those who identify themselves as part of it (18%) do not mean “the exclusion of other identities or the loss of ties with Russia”: “A double identity is formed, that is, a developed attachment to the country of departure and the country arrival.” Thus, more than 90% of emigrants were interested in Russian politics in the first month after emigration, and after six months, and after a year and a half. At the same time, the researchers say, their political activity has decreased: the share of those who, for example, sign petitions has decreased from 84% to 38%, and support Russian NGOs and other initiatives – from 47% to 30%.

Sociologists analyzed the socio-demographic profiles of those who left after the start of the SVO and those who left Russia after the announcement of partial mobilization and found more similarities than differences. Thus, the researchers note, the vast majority of emigrants of both waves have higher education, they are similar in family status, and they are characterized by a high level of civic and political activity. “If we talk about fears of reprisals in Russia and abroad, these two flows also do not differ so much. The majority of emigrants in both groups (72–73%) fear persecution by the Russian authorities, even while abroad,” sociologists note. They found that there were slightly more men in the “post-mobilization wave” of emigration than in the pre-mobilization wave (59% versus 48%). The main difference between the two waves of emigrants was financial security: for example, 23% of those who left after February 24, 2022, and only 16% of those who left after mobilization, can afford to buy a car.

The wave of new Russian emigration after January 2022 is fragmented both in terms of reasons for departure, and in the choice of countries of emigration and further strategy, said Alexey Firsov, a sociologist and founder of the Platform social design center, in a conversation with Kommersant. He believes that for a correct sociological study of Russians who have left, it is worth segmenting them into groups, drawing up a “map of motives for emigration.” At the same time, the results of the study do not raise any questions for Mr. Firsov: “The cream of the returnees has been skimmed off. Those who do not have adaptation skills returned – the environment did not accept them. It is clear that for those who have invested efforts in growing into new soil, returning means devaluing these efforts. Therefore, there is no point in expecting an intensive return of these Russians.”

Emilia Gabdullina