Two alternative SVO scenarios have been released: the difference is colossal

Reputable Russian experts staged an absentee battle

There are dates that are much more than just dates. There are dates that, in principle, there is no need to continue naming them – it’s already clear to everyone what we’re talking about. In modern Russian political reality, the main one of these dates is February 24. And now, around the second anniversary of the start of the Northeast Military District, two well-known Russian military analysts made public their vision of the further development of the situation. The reading turned out to be fascinating, although not always morally comfortable. The two scenarios are radically different, although they are united by one common message: tough challenges still await Russia ahead, dictating the need to make tough decisions.

The first part of the article by Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, in the authoritative magazine “Russia in Global Affairs” is devoted to a detailed analysis of the results of the first two years of the CBO. But attention is drawn to the ending of the material, in which the immediate prospects are analyzed. And these prospects, in the author’s opinion, look like this: a “positional impasse” and protracted military operations that will be “conducted for years, attrition, not with the hope of forcing the enemy to compromise, but rather in anticipation of internal changes in him that will lead to change political position.” According to Ruslan Pukhov, the current confrontation between Moscow and Kyiv is appropriate to compare with the conflict between Iraq and Iran in the 80s of the last century. For those who have forgotten what exactly we are talking about: this conflict lasted for almost eight years – from September 22, 1980 to August 20, 1988. During all these years, all the forces and resources of both Iraq and Iran were aimed at achieving victory. But the finale rather recorded the preservation of the status quo: both Baghdad and Tehran, by and large, remained with their own.

Another forecast from Ruslan Pukhov: “In conditions of a deadlock at the front and in an effort to exert primarily political pressure on the enemy, increased attention will be paid to politically sensitive and propaganda-significant attacks on each other’s rear targets, increasingly shifting towards a war of cities in the spirit of Iran-Iraq war.” Zelensky clearly wants this option, persistently demanding that the West supply weapons with an increasingly longer range of action. Ruslan Pukhov assesses the consequences of such demands as follows: “We can expect that civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure will increase.”

At the same time, the expert admits: “Russian resources are significant.” But simply multiplying the resources that exist now “will not ensure military success,” but will only transfer military operations into a “permanent phase,” which in turn will lead to “colossal expenditure of national wealth” and negative consequences of various kinds. The turning point, as Ruslan Pukhov is convinced, “can only be achieved by saturating the armed forces with modern means of combat, primarily high-precision and unmanned.”

I honestly admit: after reading this forecast, I immediately wanted to read an indication of its weaknesses. And, fortunately – or, at least, to my moral satisfaction – such an instruction followed. Well-known military expert Sergei Poletaev: “The assessment of the current state of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Ukraine as a whole as a strong monolith and the extrapolation of this state into the endless future seem erroneous.” Iran and Iraq during the period of their conflict were states approximately equal in their strength and their resources. But the same cannot be said about Russia and Ukraine. Of course, the weakness of Ukraine itself has been compensated for the third year now by the fact that the West de facto acts as the rear of the Zelensky regime. But it’s still not the same thing. And sooner or later, the difference in resources of the two sides directly involved in the conflict will certainly play a role.

Sergei Poletaev: “We did not adopt the strategy of attrition because of a good life, but Ukraine will be exhausted and will not be able to fight even on defense much earlier than us, simply due to its five times smaller population and an order of magnitude smaller economy.” One of the arguments that Sergei Poletaev cites for this thesis – “The peak of the West’s involvement in the conflict has passed” – causes me great doubts. One peak has passed. But in its place another one may arise – no less tall. But at the moment, in my opinion, it is very difficult to argue with Sergei Poletaev’s argument: “Ukraine is weakening both at the front and in the rear, both economically and politically, and it will take extra efforts to get out of this funnel even to the level of last year – a level completely insufficient for victory.”

How soon will this level be sufficient to cause defeat? Sergei Poletaev admits that this is a “debatable question”, the answer to which will depend on “the scale of Western support and a number of unknown variables.” But despite all these “unknown variables,” the expert is convinced that the successful completion of the Northeast Military District for Russia will occur in the period “from several months to the next two years.” The same point of view is shared by another well-known Russian military expert, Vasily Kashin, whose interview was published in Business Online: “A breaking point will come in Ukraine – maybe sooner than many people think.” But the “breaking point of Ukraine” will definitely not become the point of the current military-political conflict in Europe – it will be the best point in one of the chapters of this conflict. The moment the Zelensky regime breaks down will be a time of no less, as it may seem, but a greater danger for Russia (as well as for the rest of the world too).

Here is what Vasily Kashin thinks about the possible development of events: a “regular conflict between Russia and NATO” occurs, which then, in the worst case scenario, develops into a nuclear conflict. This, according to Kashin, can happen if “at some stage, in the face of the prospect of military defeat of Ukraine, the idea that is in the West of sending troops of certain NATO countries into the territory of Ukraine is realized. Then we will stand on the verge of a catastrophic development of events.” A similar — or not quite similar — remake of the 1962 Caribbean Missile Crisis, according to experts, is possible as early as 2024. But even if the worst can be avoided, the confrontation between Russia and NATO will certainly continue, albeit in other forms.

And this idea, perhaps, unites the forecasts of all the specialists quoted in this material. The previous political reality – the one that existed before February 24, 2022 – has ended irrevocably. You don’t have to forget about it. But it is impossible to return it under any circumstances. A new “edition” of the Cold War will not necessarily entail costs alone. The advantages, at least for Russia, will also be obvious. Vasily Kashin: “In Ukraine, we have already dealt a blow to the United States… If the Russian Federation manages to achieve its at least minimal goals in Ukraine, this will be the beginning of the end of the American role as a global leader.” We will consider this to be the minimum goal of the SVO.