The cycle of pre-election debates of Russian presidential candidates has ended

The cycle of pre-election debates of Russian presidential candidates has ended

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Last week the cycle of pre-election debates of candidates for the presidency of Russia ended. The nominees themselves and their proxies appeared on federal television channels over 20 times. However, wide representation on air did not allow politicians to go beyond their own electoral niches, according to experts interviewed by Kommersant. Although some candidates, as well as their individual representatives, did receive certain political dividends.

A total of 24 rounds of debates took place on federal television channels: four on Channel One, five on Rossiya 1, six on Rossiya 24, five on TVC and four more on OTR. More often than others, candidate from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Nikolai Kharitonov personally participated in joint events, appearing on screens nine times; Vladislav Davankov (“New People”) and Leonid Slutsky (LDPR) attended six and four broadcasts, respectively. The current president, Vladimir Putin, refused to participate in the federal debates, although his proxies spoke in many regional television discussions.

Personal activity largely ensured Nikolai Kharitonov’s leading position in the multi-component author’s rating of political scientist, member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation Alexander Asafov (published on Telegram), formed as a result of the debates. “Even though Kharitonov did not always know how to enter into a constructive discussion with opponents and often spoke with the same, long-known slogans about “wild capitalism,” he nevertheless went to debates more efficiently than anyone else and tried to attract the attention of the audience,” the expert explained in the comments to the rating.

President of the Minchenko Consulting Foundation Evgeny Minchenko, however, considers another politician to be the favorite in the debate: “Davankov got the greatest effect, because he was the only candidate who did not fight with Vladimir Putin for the same electorate.” For example, in a face-to-face discussion on foreign policy issues, Messrs. Slutsky and Kharitonov “spoke from jingoistic positions,” the political scientist recalled: “Actually, the question is: how do you guys differ from Putin? He’s already doing this, and you say that he’s great… Well, okay, thank you.” “In this sense, the winner of the debate is Davankov,” Mr. Minchenko is sure. “The rest of the participants appealed to him one way or another, and he himself worked for those voters who are not Putin’s voters at the moment.”

Political scientist Konstantin Kalachev is also ready to give leadership to Vladislav Davankov – with reservations about excitement and “lack of drive”: “He was not bad, and maybe I would even put him in first place, because he is at least somewhat alive! » However, in general, according to the expert, there were no truly noticeable favorites, much less winners, in this cycle, since none of the candidates “proved themselves clearly.”

Experts also note that the debate participants worked strictly within their own electoral niches. “Who won or lost is subjective and depends on who is listening. Since both the candidates and their proxies addressed completely different audiences, this is clear to their voters,” points out Alexander Asafov. According to Evgeniy Minchenko, Nikolai Kharitonov appealed to “such orthodox Stalinists”, Leonid Slutsky – to jingoists and “for some reason to village residents” (perhaps sociological research gave LDPR technologists the idea that they “may have something there” find something,” the expert suggests), Vladislav Davankov – to residents of large cities, young people and entrepreneurs. “Not a single candidate has become ‘people’s’,” agrees Konstantin Kalachev. “All have remained niche.”

Focusing on attracting “our own voters” and persuading “those who are undecided, but close in political compass” is a meaningful strategy, all the more obvious in conditions when the main intrigue of the campaign, judging by the varying results of opinion polls, remains the fight for second place, argues Alexander Asafov: “ If you spend too much time trying to convince others, you won’t bring your own people, and you won’t convince others.” According to Konstantin Kalachev, commitment to one’s own niche is also dictated by the “red lines” outlined on the political field, crossing which can cause “serious discontent.” “The internal censor, apparently, interfered very much,” suggests Mr. Kalachev. “As a result, no one actually went beyond the niche, but from the point of view of working out the target audience, everyone deserved a “satisfactory” or even “good” rating.” The only candidate who even tried to expand the audience was Vladislav Davankov, the expert stipulates: “And it was clear that he really wanted second place.”

Against this background, proxies often turned out to be “more interesting” than their candidates, continues Konstantin Kalachev: “The same Alexander Khurudzhi for the New People, Nikita Berezin for the LDPR, Vera Ganzya for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation – they themselves surpassed their own candidates, since the internal censor in them spoke not so loud, and the “red lines” were not so clearly defined.” Evgeny Minchenko partly agrees with this: “I would say that Davankov and Kharitonov looked stronger than their proxies, but Slutsky’s representatives looked stronger than him.” Among the speakers from the “New People,” Mr. Minchenko also singles out Alexander Khurudzhi, and among the proxies of the LDPR candidate are Nikita Berezin and Alexander Starovoitov. Alexander Asafov also gives a positive assessment of the speeches of proxies: “Of course, the speakers corresponded to the candidates, it turned out to be a successful cast: if we take the communists, both Vera Ganzya and Evgeny Spitsyn are very bright speakers who personify the position of the party, and “New People”, of course “Alexander Khurudzhi is the undisputed star of all federal debates.”

These discussions did not gain widespread popular attention, notes Konstantin Kalachev, referring to television ratings: “Neither in form nor in content did the debates and the dramaturgy of the debates correspond to popular demand, which is why they did not look particularly good.” The very idea of ​​holding meetings on given topics implied serious responsibility for the presenters (who, to put it mildly, did not help the candidates, the political scientist complains), and the format “did not imply anything other than self-presentation.” “This, of course, is good, but people want passion,” explains Mr. Kalachev. “What do you remember about the 2018 elections? The fact that Ksenia Sobchak poured a glass of water on Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Nobody remembers what they discussed, but it was an event!”

In the 2018 debates there really was “much more of a show element,” agrees Alexander Asafov. However, the current cycle, in his opinion, turned out to be “much more meaningful,” which allows us to talk about the maturation of both society and the politicians themselves: “We have taken a fairly serious step into political maturity, now debates are a much more meaningful and less emotional detail of the electoral campaigns… It used to be seen as a show, and for the most part it was a show.” Debates in the current format “will benefit our political system at least by the fact that various positions and ideas were discussed out loud,” even if some of them “were very extravagant,” the expert summarizes.

Grigory Leiba

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