Survey on the attitude of Russians towards new regions and their residents

State rhetoric regarding the development of new regions is “overheated,” according to experts from the Center for Social and Political Studies and Information Technologies of the Russian State University for the Humanities. According to their data, 28% of Russians consider the support provided to these territories to be excessive, 53% are convinced that the assistance provided is sufficient, and only 7% are confident that it is not enough. This is because, the authors of the study explain, people learn about what is happening in the new constituent entities of the Russian Federation mainly from the media and other information sources, but do not know the real problems of the residents of the new territories.

In general, the level of acceptance of new regions in Russian society is quite high: 63% of respondents have a positive attitude towards their inclusion in the Russian Federation, 28% are neutral and only 8% have a negative attitude. An online survey of 1,200 respondents was conducted as part of a study that also included a series of interviews with residents of new regions and focus groups with Russians of different ages.

The dominant feature in the attitude towards new citizens of the Russian Federation (and one of the factors for a good attitude) is empathy – this is how 49% of respondents described their emotions. 14% of respondents feel joy, 13% feel indifference. A total of 4% experience guilt, shame and irritation. Positive assessments are higher among middle-aged and older people. This is partly explained by the latter’s experience of living in the same state with residents of the annexed regions, the authors of the study note. Thus, some focus group participants associated their approval with the thesis of “coming home”: since people wanted unification, we should accept them.

The population of the new regions is very similar in identity to the citizens of Russia: 55% of survey participants believe that the inhabitants of these territories are more likely to be Russians, and only 15% – that they are more likely to be Ukrainians (another 18% consider them to be representatives of some kind of “special community”). But at the same time, 55% of respondents are still inclined to identify the difference between new citizens of the Russian Federation and old ones in terms of values, mentality and traditions. 9% believe that these differences are strong.

Here’s how focus group participants talk about it. “It seems to me that mentally they are a little different, well, they lived in a different country and so on, so it doesn’t change like that.” “In relation to nationality, I think they are Ukrainians, after all, they have been Ukraine all their lives. Well, if with our peoples, then probably closer to the Don Cossacks, more to Rostov.” In other words, explains Aleksey Firsov, director of the Platform center, a long stay within Ukraine seems to respondents to be a good reason to attribute their special qualities to the residents of new regions, although they usually find it difficult to describe them rationally. 31% of respondents stated that there were no differences between residents of the old and new regions.

Every fourth Russian (25%) provided assistance to residents of the new territories in one form or another. Twice as many people are ready to personally take part in various forms of support – 55%.

At the same time, the survey showed certain problems and gaps in perception, Mr. Firsov notes: 53% of Russians believe that assistance to new regions is provided in sufficient volume, and another 28% assess it as excessive. Only 7% are sure that support is rather insufficient. During in-depth interviews, a number of respondents expressed suspicion that social investment in new regions may reduce the level of support for traditional territories. “Huge money will now be poured into these regions,” says one of the respondents. “Again, there are some benefits for real estate there. It’s just that a lot of money will be spent, and this is all our money, and I hope that the regions in the future will turn out to be somehow economically profitable, so that everything was not done in vain, so that Russia continues to develop, and not just “protect” part of the Russian people from some nationalists.”

There is also criticism of housing certificates for immigrants from new territories: respondents believe that they provoke an increase in real estate prices. “Now people in the Kherson region are being given certificates for the purchase of real estate. Accordingly, because of this, real estate prices specifically in our Krasnodar Territory and Crimea, I know, have also risen, because there is demand. People are given 1.5 million per person, a family of three people gets 4.5 million easily, apartments immediately go up in price.”

Based on the results of focus groups, it is clear that people do not have insiders in new regions; they learn about what is happening there from the media and other information sources, but are not aware of the real problems, the authors of the study believe. From these data, the patriotic part of Russians reads that there is enough help, and the critical part – that there is too much of it. Information policy creates a trap: it seeks to show how much Russia is doing to restore, but thereby gives rise to the suspicion that all this is at the expense of the Russian hinterland.

However, the position “we need to help as much as is needed” is also well demonstrated, since we are all from a supranational community. “We are not talking about nationality now, but about our spiritual kinship, because we ourselves are from a huge country, the Soviet Union, and thank God that they returned to their harbor and can live normally. I’m glad that Mariupol is being rebuilt, beautiful roads and educational institutions have begun to be built,” says one of the study participants.

In turn, from in-depth interviews with residents of new regions, it becomes clear that the main problems for them now are the availability of social services (primarily medicine), the loss of familiar services after leaving Ukraine, despite the fact that replacement in reality did not occur (including because Russian business does not go to the regions), as well as dissatisfaction with the local bureaucracy.

Anastasia Kornya