General Gromov: “Those who talk about our defeat in Afghanistan are storytellers”

— Boris Vsevolodovich, in total, your “Afghan experience” in three visits is five and a half years. What period was the most difficult for you?

— Perhaps, the beginning of the first business trip. I arrived there in January 1980, and active hostilities began in March. By that time I had graduated from the Frunze Academy and, as I thought, was prepared for anything. I was then a colonel, chief of staff of the 108th division in Kabul. Mujahideen attacks occurred before March, but we could not respond – this was strictly prohibited.

In March, I began to lead the combat operations of subordinate units near Kabul. The most difficult period that remains in my memory is precisely those days. Since then, I have drawn one of the main conclusions: you cannot go into battle without understanding the situation.

— What surprised or shocked you when you found yourself in Afghanistan?

— The first military episode that shocked me occurred in February 1980. Our 108th division was stationed on the northern outskirts of Kabul. Then we moved the headquarters to Bagram. Division command meetings were held regularly, as was customary in peacetime in the USSR. After one of these meetings, as usual, they gave the order to the meeting participants to disperse to their units. An hour later, a report was received that on the road from Kabul to Bagram a car was fired upon and a lieutenant colonel, commander of an engineer battalion, and his driver were killed. The attackers violated the corpses – they slashed them with knives, cut off their ears, gouged out their eyes…

I went to the place. It was a terrible shock. After all, we were brought up in peaceful conditions and thought that such atrocities were impossible in principle, but it turned out that they were possible. Throughout the nine years that Soviet troops were in Afghanistan, such cases were repeated.

— What opinion do you have about ordinary Afghans?

“The Afghans, who were not part of any Mujahideen units, were sincere and very good people. They lived very poorly, but they were characterized by wisdom, humanity, and a friendly attitude towards people, including us, Shuravi. Maybe they didn’t throw themselves on anyone’s neck, but they had their own code of honor and behavior. They treated us, the Soviet people, very well, and we treated them too. We helped them a lot, built, supplied food. They appreciated it.

—Have you tried Afghan food?

— I tried Afghan tandoori flatbreads. Very tasty, especially when hot.

— Have you learned any expressions in Dari or Pashto?

“I know a few words, but it’s better not to say them out loud.”

— Did the Soviet Union have a chance of success in Afghanistan? How did your opinion on this matter change as the war progressed? In general, was there a military solution to the Afghan problem?

— I’ve been to Afghanistan three times. At first, I could not judge the correctness of the decision taken by the country’s leadership; as they say, I did not have all the information. A year and a half later, when I got to know almost all of Afghanistan and visited everywhere, I realized that the idea that they wanted to bring to life was impossible. At that time, both the United States and NATO did everything to ensure that the USSR got stuck in Afghanistan.

I became convinced of this during meetings with the commander-in-chief of NATO’s southern forces. They didn’t hide it. In my opinion, when making the decision to send troops and international assistance to Afghanistan, the leadership of the USSR, apparently, did not take everything into account. Or there were other political issues that we do not know about. Now it is obvious to me that the deployment of troops was not fully thought through.

During the first two years of our troops’ stay there, it became obvious to many officers and the leadership of the 40th Army (the USSR Ministry of Defense, by the way, was initially against the deployment of troops) that measures had to be taken to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. There were no tasks as such for the 40th Army. The only task was to maintain a calm situation in Afghanistan in order to avoid the penetration of military forces from outside.

The deployment of troops to Afghanistan, as I understand it, was a proactive step; we wanted to get ahead of the Americans. This can be considered the only reason for the entry of Soviet troops into the DRA. But this issue could have been resolved differently. For example, send not a 140,000-strong group of Soviet troops, but limit it to at least 30,000. These forces would be enough to maintain stability and power in the main areas.

Afghanistan could not be abandoned, it was necessary to help, but it had to be done differently – politically and economically. In particular, if there were problems and the threat of a military conflict with Pakistan, special forces could be sent. Moscow had them – the same special forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). At the 40th Army there was a GRU intelligence center, under whose control was the entire territory of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.

— How was the decision to withdraw troops made?

— Since the beginning of 1983, the command of the 40th Army purposefully raised the issue of troop withdrawal before the Ministry of Defense, our embassy in Kabul, and everyone who made such decisions. We prepared the documents and sent them to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on Old Square in Moscow. The decision to withdraw troops began to be seriously considered in 1985, when it became clear that the issue could not be resolved by force.

Finally, a decision was made in Geneva. The so-called Geneva Agreement was signed between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The USSR and the USA acted as guarantors. The agreement defined the timing of the withdrawal of troops: the start of the withdrawal was scheduled for May 15, 1988, and the end for February 15, 1989. The only thing was that the order of withdrawal of troops was not outlined, since this was determined by the command of the 40th Army.

It was the command of the 40th Army that insisted on the withdrawal of troops, since all the tasks that depended on us in Afghanistan had been solved. We showed everyone, including the Americans, that as long as there was a 40-army in Afghanistan, it was useless to go there and fight with the USSR. Americans are still talking about this. However, the United States did everything to detain Soviet troops in Afghanistan for as long as possible.

— There is an opinion that the USSR was defeated in this war. What do you think?

— After the withdrawal of troops, those who have no idea what Afghanistan is, who did not fight there, often told and continue to tell fables that the USSR and the 40th Army were defeated in Afghanistan. There were no tasks that the 40th Army could not complete. It was a very powerful army. There can be no talk of any defeat.

The forces that were there were simply incomparable. On one side were us, and on the other were those who acted at the behest of the United States. The Americans acted secretly. The former CIA chief wrote about this in his memoirs. The United States did everything with the hands of the Pakistanis and those Afghans who were on the side of Pakistan.

And most importantly, the 40th Army in Afghanistan never received the task of winning by military means from anyone. When they say that our army was defeated there, then these people should be called “storytellers.”

— How were the preparations for the withdrawal and the withdrawal itself?

— The United States, I repeat, did everything to ensure that the withdrawal either did not take place, and even if it did take place, it would be with huge losses for us. We prepared seriously, we involved everything that was possible: both space and other types of intelligence that existed at that time. We knew everything about every kilometer of Afghanistan.

The withdrawal of troops was carried out in two directions: western, along the Iranian border, and central – through the south, southwest to Kabul, through Salang to Termez and Kushka. We have established and maintained contact with all the leaders of the Alliance of Seven. We had the most powerful agents among them. We corresponded and met personally with many leaders. Ultimately, in completing preparations for the start of the withdrawal, letters signed by me were sent to everyone. Officially, as commander of the 40th Army, I was the representative of the USSR government for Afghanistan. All agreements went through me. Everyone was warned, including in writing. Moreover, we sent letters to those who supported opponents of the Kabul authorities in Pakistan.

The withdrawal took place with virtually no losses, although it was very difficult. The position of Shevardnadze, who then headed the USSR Foreign Ministry, complicated the withdrawal of troops. He insisted on not withdrawing the army within the time frame specified by the Geneva Agreement, and if withdrawing, then leaving 30 thousand people in Afghanistan along the Kabul-Termez road in support of the DRA and the Afghan army.

We did not agree to this; there were disagreements. When the first stage of withdrawal took place from May 15 to August 15, 1988, a command came from Moscow to stop the withdrawal. That is, there was an official break, which was recorded in the protocol to the agreement.

Troops began leaving Kabul exactly a month before the end of the withdrawal. It was very difficult to withdraw a huge number of troops from Kabul through Salang in just a month, when there were “spirits” sitting on the right and left.

“It is known that an agreement was reached with Ahmad Shah Massoud that he would allow a column of Soviet troops to pass through the Salang Pass without a fight. How did you manage to reach an agreement? What was your relationship like with him?

“He was a worthy person, despite the fact that he was one of our main opponents. Ahmad Shah understood everything perfectly. The people who lived in the Panjshir Gorge loved him very much. Masud was a very obliging person. If he made a promise, then you could be 100% sure that he would keep it.

I met him once before the withdrawal of troops. This was in May 1988. Before that, we wrote letters to each other and passed them on through intelligence officers. We discussed everything, settled all the problems, organized interaction so that something unexpected would not happen. We had passwords, and we also encrypted communications so that someone else could not speak on behalf of Ahmad Shah.

The last time we agreed on a meeting place. This was not far from the location of the 177th Regiment, before entering the foothills where the mountainous part of the road to Salang begins. The road to Panjshir went to the right, and the main road went straight: Kabul – Salang Pass – Turgundi. We met at the junction of two roads without security. We talked for about five minutes and confirmed the agreement.

After that we corresponded often. And then we were set up. Shevardnadze insisted that before the withdrawal of troops, when our last two columns had to cross Salang, we had to deliver a powerful blow to Akhmad Shah, which was done. Even when we struck, Masud did not strike back.

— There is information that the attack was carried out on empty gorges. This is true?

— The strike was carried out on targets provided by Moscow and the GRU. Gorbachev named the goals, the Minister of Defense was told about this. Perhaps somehow our people warned Ahmad Shah that we were forced to strike. Targets along the road were indicated where there were people subordinate to Massoud. About 90% of them left.

They had their own agents, and we also warned them. The strikes were carried out in depth – to the east and west of Salang. Long-range aviation from the territory of the USSR was also involved. But we were categorically against these attacks. We called Moscow and said that the 40th Army would not participate in this. In fact, we have crossed the line of subordination.

We explained that if these strikes reach their target, the troops that remained at the entrance to the Salang pass will not leave Afghanistan. If the Mujahideen had struck back, a tragedy would have occurred.

— What were the first thoughts and words you had when the withdrawal of troops ended?

“I said to myself something like this: “Thank God it’s all over.” There was no strength to speak. There were also words that were best left unsaid.

— Did you have any desire to go to Afghanistan? Have you been there after the withdrawal of troops?

– There was no such desire. I have been to almost every point in Afghanistan. I don’t have very good memories associated with these places.