Expectations of the first and second kind – Kommersant

The reasons why the risks of nationalization of the economy exist even with the obvious advantages of private interest are not limited to ideological motives. Apparently, the motive for reducing political risks is more common: competition is noisy, noise interferes with the work of the apparatus and creates surprises. Nationalization looks like a guarantee of peace, a value whose adherence to the authorities is rather underestimated. However, using the example of the devaluation of the ruble, it is easy to demonstrate how the process of long-term coordination of interests within the state generates problems itself.

By itself, the decision to increase the key rate could not but affect the rate in the following days: although it will reduce domestic demand in the Russian Federation for imports only in a few months, there are other channels of influence. The term “expectations” can hide both literally inflationary expectations and expectations by currency market players of informal but dangerous accusations of “playing against the ruble” – everyone managed to make sure of the strength of the latter on August 16, when, despite the decision of the Central Bank, stubbornly growing before that to 100 rubles/$, the exchange rate was frightened by unofficial information about a meeting with the president about it.

The possibility of tacit regulation of markets has a price – a considerable one, discussed non-publicly and influencing the further development of events

His supposed agenda, due to the circumstances, was rather pointless. The sale of 90% of foreign exchange earnings, which the Ministry of Finance allegedly demanded, is apparently not feasible – it will make impossible the complex gray import schemes implemented with the encouragement of the White House. Approximately the same limits the use of other measures that slow down cross-border capital flows. As for foreign exchange interventions – in the current thin market, this is not too expensive – whether Sberbank, the Central Bank, VTB, Gazprombank, NOVATEK or even the Ministry of Finance are involved in them, the result will be, it will be short-term and has no non-political meaning.

But even in this area, “expectations of the second kind” work, that is, expectations of dissatisfaction with the authorities, and they are stronger than the fear of losses, and even more so of shortfalls in profits. Who exactly and how was instructed to “restore the ruble” is unknown, and it is impossible to talk about it out loud, since the optimization parameter is “noise cessation”: the results of the meeting have not been published, as well as confirmation that it was.

It would seem that the problem has been solved – has the ruble left the “fatal” mark of 100 rubles/$? But the issue price now needs to include losses / expenses that the collective state will have to compensate for an unknown “savior”, be it Sberbank, Gazprom or a large private financial group. There is no way to determine exactly at what rate the yuan is converted into silence, and the appointment of the guilty ones into lost profits, but very soon, in two or three months, this issue will be resolved at unofficial and very tense negotiations within the government. We have been seeing this process for many years and we understand: yes, you will become nervous here.