China’s share in Russian trade amounted to 32% in ten months of 2023

China’s share in Russian trade at the end of ten months of 2023 was 32% – this estimate is given in a review by the Gaidar Institute (GIE). Based on data from Chinese customs, the IEP calculated that the PRC’s share in Russian imports during this period was 41%, and in exports – 26%. In January-October, Chinese exports to the Russian Federation in monetary terms amounted to $90.1 billion (an increase of 51% compared to the same period in 2022), $54.9 billion of this amount came from machinery, equipment and vehicles imported to the Russian Federation.

At the end of the entire year, trade turnover with China could reach $225 billion, which is 22% higher than in 2022 and 60% higher than in 2021. Let us recall that Moscow and Beijing expected to increase bilateral trade to $200 billion by 2024 – the IEP data, as well as the statistics previously presented by Chinese customs (see Kommersant on December 8), indicate that this plan was completed ahead of schedule. Let us note that the road map in which this threshold was outlined was adopted even before the start of the Russian military operation in Ukraine.

For China, Russia remains a much less significant trading partner, the IEP recalls: its share in China’s trade turnover in January-October 2023 amounted to only 3.9%: Russian goods accounted for 5.1% of imports to China, supplies to the Russian sales market amounted to 3.3% of its exports. Imports of Russian goods in January-October amounted to $106.3 billion (13% more than in the same period last year). $81.8 billion of this is fuel, which became the main driver of growth in supplies to China after the reorientation of Russian exports. The Russian Federation’s share in the total volume of Chinese fuel imports increased over ten months to 18.4% (by 2.3 points compared to the same period in 2022).

China’s key trading partners remain countries that the Russian Federation considers “unfriendly”—primarily the EU (13.2% of China’s trade turnover) and the United States (11.2%). The IEP reminds: given their shares in Chinese trade and the fact that it is easier to replace raw materials than industrial goods, we can say that China’s dependence on countries “unfriendly” to the Russian Federation significantly exceeds its dependence on Moscow. “This increases the possibility of using secondary sanctions to restrict mutual trade between China and Russia, especially in the case of sanctions against individual companies,” the review’s authors conclude.

Kristina Borovikova