What will the withdrawal of Russia’s ratification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban lead to?

After Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statement on October 5 that Moscow could withdraw ratification of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin on October 6 expressed his readiness to consider the issue at the next session of the council of the lower house.

Presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov later clarified that the withdrawal of ratification does not mean Moscow will necessarily resume nuclear tests. “The President primarily meant the need to bring the de facto situation to a common denominator. In order to bring it to a common denominator, the president allowed the possibility of revoking this ratification,” Peskov said, adding that this is exactly what Volodin had in mind. According to the president’s press secretary, the problem with the CTBT is that Russia signed and ratified “a long time ago,” but “the Americans did not ratify.”

Speaking at the plenary session of the 20th annual meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club on October 5, Putin admitted that, theoretically, withdrawal of ratification of the CTBT is possible. He clarified that he could not say whether Russia now needs nuclear weapons tests. “In principle, it is possible to behave in a mirror manner in relations with the United States. But this is a question for the State Duma deputies. Theoretically, it is possible to revoke ratification, if we do this, that will be quite enough,” he clarified.

In September 2023, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin said that Moscow calls on the United States to immediately ratify the CTBT. According to him, Washington could become a driving force in this matter and set an example for other states.

The UN General Assembly approved the CTBT on September 24, 1996. The document prohibits testing nuclear weapons and carrying out nuclear explosions even for peaceful purposes. The moratorium applies in the atmosphere, in space, under water and underground on the territory of all states. The CTBT has been signed and ratified by Russia, most EU countries, Canada, and most of the countries of South America, Africa, and Central Asia. Signed but not ratified by the United States, Egypt, Israel, Iran, China and a number of other countries. India, North Korea and Pakistan did not sign the agreement.

Vedomosti interviewed international affairs experts about what consequences such a decision from Moscow could entail and what opportunities it could provide.

The withdrawal of ratification of the treaty does not change anything, because such major players as the United States and China themselves did not ratify it, Alexander Ermakov, a researcher at the IMEMO RAS, told Vedomosti. At the same time, the CTBT prohibits underground testing of nuclear weapons, and tests “in three environments” – air, water and space – are regulated by another agreement – the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (Moscow Treaty of 1963) , Ermakov emphasizes.

The main condition enshrined in the 1963 document signed by the USSR, USA and Great Britain was a ban on conducting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. But he left open the possibility of underground nuclear explosions, which is what the parties to the treaty did until the end of the Cold War (the last test was carried out by the United States in 1992, the USSR in 1990). In 1996, when the CTBT was signed, the limited ban regime became unconditional and took into account the ban on underground testing.

By 2023, the number of participants in the 1963 Moscow Treaty had expanded to 131 states. At the same time, 2 out of 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council (France and China) never joined it.

Withdrawal from the CTBT does not mean that Russia will begin conducting tests before its geopolitical opponents take such actions, believes Andrei Kortunov, scientific director of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). According to the expert, consideration of the issue in the State Duma is a proactive step, but this does not yet mean the start of testing.

At the same time, the termination of the agreement, which has not formally entered into force but is “actually observed by nuclear powers,” could create problems for strategic stability in the world, the expert fears. In particular, Kortunov believes, this will spur the arms race, since nuclear powers will be able to “directly test a new generation of warheads with all the ensuing consequences – military-technical and political.”

According to Ermakov, the withdrawal of ratification of the CTBT could also, on the contrary, help Russia “sharpen the problem” of nuclear tests and spur the United States and China to ratify the agreement. But the opportunity to resume underground nuclear testing could be seized by those who have abstained from it for the past 30 years. “There is a possibility that underground nuclear testing will resume on a small scale. Previously, about 1,500 of them were carried out by all nuclear powers,” says the expert.

According to him, despite the huge amount of data collected during the tests of 1963-1992, now with more modern computing and recording technology they could be more complete. “In addition, the question of age-related changes in previously fired charges arises. Theoretically, plutonium (material for nuclear charges – Vedomosti) is durable, but in practice hydrodynamic subcritical tests do not provide guarantees. Finally, the question arises of creating completely new charges that were not tested during the Cold War, rather than servicing or modernizing old ones,” says Ermakov.

At the same time, nominally withdrawing from the CTBT makes it possible to resume peaceful nuclear explosions for civilian purposes. In the USSR, in 1965-1988, as part of the civilian nuclear program, 124 peaceful nuclear explosions were carried out for seismic testing or the formation of cavities in order to create large underground gas and oil storage facilities, as well as in attempts to simplify the extraction of a number of minerals.

But, according to nuclear safety expert and editor-in-chief of the industry portal AtomInfo.ru Alexander Uvarov, it is too early to talk about a return to peaceful nuclear testing. According to him, the implementation of similar initiatives in the USSR with the aim of creating gas storage facilities did not always turn out to be cost-effective and safe. “If it were profitable, it would be continued,” the expert noted. He emphasized that before using underground testing for economic purposes, it is necessary to take into account all existing risks, including transboundary factors.

According to Ermakov, limited practical use of nuclear explosions for economic purposes is now hardly possible “due to the environmental agenda.” “Although no serious environmental consequences have actually been recorded after underground nuclear tests,” the expert concluded.