What signals did Putin and Erdogan exchange?

The Russian leader, during his speech at the Valdai discussion club, noted that Erdogan is not trying to “sit on the neck” of Russia, and that the Turkish president is “a consistent and reliable partner, although not an easy one.” What else could not fail to attract attention from what was said was Putin’s thoughts about the UN Security Council. In particular, that its structure should reflect the diversity of world regions, including Asia, Africa and Latin America. Which 100% fits into Erdogan’s thesis “the world is more than five!” (permanent members of the UN Security Council. — I.S.). And this means that Russia and Turkey may be on the same wavelength in the issue of UN reform, and this is indeed a strategic item on the agenda.

In turn, on the eve of the 99th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey, which the country celebrated on October 29, during the keynote speech “Turkey’s Centenary” at the 30,000-seat sports arena in Ankara, President Erdogan mentioned Putin. Vladimir Vladimirovich was the only foreign leader whom the Turkish president mentioned by name. And Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke about Russian-Turkish plans to create a gas hub in Turkey and distribute Russian gas to Europe through Turkey.

In sharp contrast to this, the Turkish president’s mention of his country’s ongoing struggle against imperialism and the video he showed about the development of the Turkish military-industrial complex. The United States, which after the Second World War had a hand in reorienting Turkish military enterprises to the production of consumer goods, became an obstacle in the way of which. Instead of air bombs, there are potbelly stoves, and this is not a metaphor. This is exactly what was shown in the video.

Why is it worth paying special attention to these words and gestures of Putin and Erdogan? Because in both cases it was about policy statements that set the vector for the future. Both at Valdai and at the 30,000-strong sports arena in Ankara.

Both these words and gestures indicate the mutual intention of the Russian and Turkish leaders to further develop bilateral relations not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively, through the implementation of new strategic initiatives – whether it be the creation of a gas hub or the construction by Russia of the second Turkish Sinop nuclear power plant as a logical continuation of Akkuyu NPP. Not to mention the emerging similar approaches to reforming the world architecture, including the UN and its institutions.

Turkey’s approach of “the world is more than five” is not a secret, however, when the leader of a country from among the “Big Five” of the UN Security Council speaks about the need to expand its composition to include the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, this, we agree, is an application for sensationalism.

Does this mean that Russian-Turkish relations, thanks to the so-called “leadership diplomacy”, will have cloudless years ahead? And earlier this was not noticed in bilateral relations, and now even more so.

Let’s start with the fact that Turkey is now under, without exaggeration, unprecedented pressure from the West in an attempt to force the country to impose full-fledged anti-Russian sanctions. Until this has been successful, “American chain letters” and “explanatory” activities by the American diplomatic institutions in the country continue, aimed at uniting Turkish businesses and major players.

In this situation, the Turkish leadership is forced to take a balanced position: it does not encourage, but does not stop Turkish business from building up cooperation with Russia, calling for considering exclusively the commercial side of the issue. Perhaps this is the most reasonable position of the Turkish leadership – being under Western pressure, to demonstrate their political non-involvement in the development of Russian-Turkish contacts, which are already growing exponentially.

How much Turkey will last in this situation is a big question. There are already direct threats from the West against Turkey to impose sanctions for special relations with Russia. The idea that you can hide behind the status of a peacekeeping country is working so far, but the effect of it seems to be starting to decline.

Another source of risk for Russian-Turkish relations in their current configuration is the internal political situation in Turkey, which is approaching its next fork: no later than June 2023, presidential and parliamentary elections should be held in Turkey. They promise to be one of the most difficult for the current authorities in the country – against the backdrop of the consolidation of the opposition and the ongoing economic difficulties.

Nobody can predict the results of the 2023 elections in Turkey now. Although in recent months the Turkish authorities have been able to turn the not-too-favorable electoral situation in their favor, there is still no way to talk about a guaranteed outcome.

The coming to power in Ankara of the opposition, which does not hide its pro-Western attitude, will at best mean a break in continuity in Russian-Turkish relations – the need to rebuild what had been building up between official Moscow and Ankara for decades. Not to mention the more gloomy forecasts that the strategic areas of Russian-Turkish cooperation may be either frozen or completely dismantled by the pro-Western opposition.

The third risk for bilateral relations is the development of the situation on the Ukrainian battlefields. This includes, among other things, the suspension of the situation in the air, the prolongation of the conflict, the lack of a convincing demonstration of superiority on the Russian side.

Let us not fall into idealism inappropriate in political matters. In general, one can talk about any fruitful relations with foreign partners – and Turkey is no exception – only if one is in a strong position. Any loosening of the grip means that a strategic recalculation will be carried out by external partners, conclusions will be drawn and appropriate practical steps will be taken.

In conclusion, one cannot fail to mention the Achilles’ heel of bilateral relations – the presence of intersecting and conflicting interests of Russia and Turkey in a number of regions and countries of the world. And if at the tactical level – in the same Syria, Libya, in the South Caucasus – Russia and Turkey manage to find a balance of interests, then at the strategic, long-term, less visible to the eye, our country has obvious problems.

While the Russian leadership after the collapse of the USSR spoke about the fundamental absence of ideology in our country, and the national idea was reduced to the growth of prosperity, exactly at the same period, the Turkish leadership developed its own idea and began its active and quite successful practical implementation. We are talking about the Organization of Turkic States and the slogan that says: “The 21st century will be the century of the awakening of the Turks!”

What exactly did President Recep Tayyip Erdogan present on October 28 at the sports arena in Ankara to a standing chanting audience of 30,000? The project “Centenary of Turkey”, which implies exactly the same thing – the final transformation of Turkey into a global player in the foreseeable future and further consolidation around Ankara of the Turkic world. Not only does this project cover the South Caucasus and Central Asia. It cannot but echo in the Russian expanses, a significant part of which is the territory of the Turkic subjects of the Russian Federation.

I wrote more than once in my telegram channel and I will repeat again: the problem is not what kind of national idea Turkey has. The question is what idea do we have. What are we building and why should this construction be inspiring for all the peoples inhabiting our country? For any external national idea, we must have our own national idea, and the presence of not just a balance in this issue, but an intellectual and ideological advantage is a matter of national security, a matter of the country’s survival.

No matter what “leadership diplomacy” binds us with Turkey and with other countries, nature does not tolerate emptiness: in the spaces not filled with its own, socially accepted national idea, other people’s ideas will roam, take root and germinate, splitting society and the country from the inside.

These days, one can often hear that in the crucible of the NVO, the Russian national idea is finally born, and it is born from within, and not implanted from above. I only wish that she, when listing what we are against, would not forget to indicate what we stand for as a whole of Russian society. And this is not the work of one day or even eight months of a special military operation, and the work is purposeful. The problem is that the results of this work are needed just yesterday …