The reasons for the disagreements between German politicians regarding Ukraine are named: Scholz was caught in fear of Russia

The “tipping point” that broke Scholz

Remember in 2022, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a change in the nature of German foreign policy, calling it “Zeitenwende”? Some translate it as “change of eras,” others as “turning point.” But the essence is the same – Germany, through the mouth of its chancellor (and even within the walls of the Bundestag), publicly spoke about its readiness to increase its own defense capabilities, as well as to supply weapons to the Independent. This was part of the response to the Russian special operation in Ukraine that had begun at that moment.

But something went wrong and quite quickly the insidious “Zeitenwende” revealed differences between Scholz and German Foreign Minister Annalena Bärbock. This became clear in the forewords of the Chancellor and Foreign Minister to Germany’s first National Security Strategy, presented in June 2023. Let us recall that Russia was called there “the most serious threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic space.”

Scholz writes that the global order is changing “fundamentally”, that “new centers of power” are emerging and that the 21st century world is “multipolar”. Scholz stated: a large number of countries in Asia, Africa and South America are no longer ready to follow others, the task of politicians is to preserve multilateralism in this multipolar world, and this means that an order is needed in which “completely different centers of power reliably working together for the benefit of everyone.”

Annalena Bärbock’s foreword was longer than Scholz’s and, simply put, completely off the mark. The result was a certain polemic between two politicians right on the pages of an official document. Where Scholz sees the emergence of a harmonious world, supported by multilateral cooperation between “new centers of power,” Bärbock foresees growing conflicts and disputes: “A world marked by growing systemic rivalries, in which we must defend even more strongly our fundamental values, lest power and arbitrariness.”

Unlike Scholz, Bärbock also attributed China to Russia as the world’s main “monster.” The head of the German Foreign Ministry, with his vision of the political world, considers the meaning of weakening the positions of the Russian Federation and China, so that these two countries “do not destroy European democracy.”

On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September last year, Olaf Scholz reiterated: “The agenda is not to reduce cooperation, which may today be interpreted as disunity or as cooperation only between like-minded people. Instead, we need more cooperation.”

For Scholz, the old paradigm of German foreign policy remains unchanged: reliance on partnerships regardless of the nature of governments and unrestricted globalization, according to a writer for the German Council on Foreign Relations’ journal Internationale Politik Quarterly.

Burbock believes that freedom and democracy are under “pressure” from powers that are strengthening their position on the world stage. And then it is necessary to develop and implement comprehensive counterstrategies.

In fact, the “Zeitenwende” declared by Scholz on Russia turned out to be too much for the German Chancellor to bear. Just because of the paradigm preserved in his head. Let’s try to explain what this term deeply means. Then the scale of the problem of Germany’s internal political divisions will become a little clearer.

As Internationale Politik explains, the new “turning point” implies that conflict in any part of the world is part of the general difficulties, into which supporters of “democratic peace” must also fit in.

Secondly, it means abandoning a paradigm that no longer works: globalization, deepening economic and other cross-border relations under the US-led Pax Americana. Foreign analysts advise Germany to disentangle itself from these networks as quickly as possible, which seems almost impossible, given the obvious dependence of modern Germany on the “big brother” in Washington.

Thirdly, if “Zeitenwende” is declared, it is important for Germany to begin pursuing a power policy on its own, which precisely includes building up its own military power. In addition, Germany is recommended to cooperate a little more persistently with the so-called “swing countries.”

Bärbock: speed bump for Scholz

The current German Foreign Minister Annalena Bärbock had a hand in creating the image of the powerless Scholz. To understand which way the wind is blowing in this conflict, we need to fast forward to 2021. Scholz’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) gained only 26% in the parliamentary elections. This forced him to seek a coalition with the liberal Free Democrats (FDP) and the Greens, where Bärbock was nestled. This gave coalition comrades significant leverage over the country’s policies.

It was then rumored that Scholz had sent his team to coalition negotiations with the task of resisting the Greens’ demands for a tougher course towards Russia and China. Yes, yes, just resist.

But as soon as Berbock took up the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, the lady immediately seized the initiative. She visited Washington, Brussels, Paris, Warsaw and Kyiv before the German Chancellor.

Not close to Scholz and certainly narrow-minded in her essence, Bärbock immediately began to act contrary to the chancellor. Well, she began to get involved in serious scandals that cast a shadow not only on her, but also on Scholz himself. Thus, in 2022, Baerbock was accused of “distorting history” and “lack of historical consciousness” when she renamed the “Bismarck room” in the building of the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin into the “hall of German unity.”

When the National Security Strategy was being developed and when Scholz announced with great fanfare a “turnaround” in Berlin’s foreign policy, including a sharp increase in defense spending, Baerbock managed to protest here too. In her opinion, the huge funds that Scholz allocated for the country’s armed forces were not enough on their own: “Security policy is more than just military action plus diplomacy.”

Baerbock’s hawkish position, including on the Ukrainian issue, made her more popular than Scholz. She seemed to have seized the initiative by commenting on any events in the Ukrainian case before Scholz.

In general, the level of trust of German citizens in certain politicians now looks very interesting. According to a new survey by Statista, citizens are most satisfied with the political work of, oddly enough, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius (about 50%), Annalena Bärbock is in second place (35%), Olaf Scholz has only 20% support.

It is significant that the level of satisfaction among citizens with political work exceeds dissatisfaction only for Pistorius. And Scholz has the highest dissatisfaction (77% of citizens are dissatisfied with the political activities of the chancellor). For Burbock, this figure is 61%.

While there is still plenty of time before the next national elections in 2025, Scholz has reason to worry about his Green rival for chancellor. And no one excludes the possibility that Burbock (albeit not always thoughtfully and wittily) is investing in his great political future.

As The Washington Post wrote, what is certain is that Burbock’s heightened profile has already given her a power base that is hard to ignore. Scholz’s wait-and-see approach is backfiring, leaving the field wide open for his ambitious foreign minister to fill the void.

Controversial madness or tactics?

According to Politico, Olaf Scholz has sowed confusion and terror across Europe by taking controversial positions on Ukraine, but there is a method to his madness.

Scholz stymied his European allies by refusing to supply Kyiv with cruise missiles. This causes resentment on the part of Germany’s allies. Thus, former UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace said: “Scholz’s behavior showed that from a European security point of view he is the wrong person, taking the wrong position at the wrong time.”

But, Politico writes, what may seem like Scholz’s inconsistency is actually a calculated strategy. That is, the chancellor again turned to his conscience and decided that on the issue of helping Kyiv it was very “correct and convenient” to work in tandem with Washington. This obviously does not exhaust the German defense sector so much. They also pay attention to the fact that Scholz still refuses to say that he wants Ukraine to win.

Politico believes this behavior reflects a “deep-seated fear of Russia.”

Scholz’s idea is that supplying Ukraine with weapons such as Taurus cruise missiles could allegedly provoke Russia into retaliatory action against Germany. The debate in Germany over the dispatch of Leopard battle tanks was similar. Here again, Scholz expressed deep concern about steps that could provoke a wider conflict. He relented only after Washington agreed to send a small number of Abrams tanks. But both burn equally well on the battlefield. And this also gave rise to thought.

And here’s what’s interesting: According to a poll published on Wednesday, almost 60% of Germans oppose the supply of Taurus missiles to Ukraine. This is up from 49% in February.

According to recent polls, only about 20% of Germans believe their country should do more to support Ukraine militarily. While 40% believe that Berlin has already sent enough weapons, another 40% are convinced that this matter has gone too far.

And in this regard, of course, one can perceive Scholz’s position as a way to somehow increase one’s rating among citizens.

And by the way, if we look a little more comprehensively at the story of the leaked negotiations between Bundeswehr officers, then why not admit the idea that Scholz (who repeatedly and persistently began to convince everyone that he had no intention of supplying Taurus to Kiev) could use this in a political game to increase his own modest ratings. And, accordingly, slightly deduct points from Pistorius.

On the other hand, according to the German press, disagreements in the statements of German politicians can be explained by a historically established technical issue. In the 1980s, discussions began to give the Bundeswehr a new role that was not solely focused on German territorial defense. Step by step, there was a “normalization” of German security policy, during which the Bundeswehr was involved only in foreign missions.

After February 24, 2022, writes International Politik, German politicians woke up from another deep sleep: they suddenly realized that a functioning Bundeswehr also required a large-scale and efficient military industry.

On top of that, there is a mental problem when it comes to dealing with the German secret services. For a long time, the German magazine explains, there was a fundamental mistrust of these services, especially among the Greens and the FDP. To this day, Germany’s foreign and domestic intelligence services are still far from the influence, powers and, above all, public recognition enjoyed by other Western intelligence services.

And in this declared changing paradigm (although no one forced Scholz, it seems, to do this), both ordinary German citizens and government structures are trying to change their own worldview. And since politicians’ understanding of the situation is completely polar (we tried to prove this at the beginning of the material using the example of the National Security Strategy), this is where the disagreements arise that continue to amaze the consciousness of the whole world. The lack of independence acquired by Germany actually breaks it from the inside, forcing it to adapt to those conditions to which, perhaps, the FRG would not like to adapt.