The IDF and Mossad fiasco: why their leaders missed the attack
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And the militants crossed the border so easily
Border reforms across countries have much in common. Good old-fashioned constant patrols are being replaced by automated monitoring systems coupled with rapid response teams that must travel to incident scenes.
In real conflicts this does not work well.
Border barriers near the Gaza Strip were built under Rabin. You’ve seen what they look like: blocks, fences, nets. There are sensors installed on the barriers, that is, if someone climbs in, a signal goes to the remote control. There are three checkpoints at the border: Erez, Kemer Shalom and Sufa.
In recent years, Israel has been improving its border security automation systems and even selling them for export, for example to India.
“We are talking about a complex of seismic and acoustic sensors that are buried in the ground to varying depths.” The sensors were also intended to signal the construction of illegal tunnels to the border.
Video surveillance only works near the checkpoint. Well, imagine that cars are driving to the checkpoint and it is assumed by default that there are ordinary Palestinians inside. Then the militants jump out and begin an attack on the border checkpoint. Israeli forces begin to gather there (and it’s also Shabbat and 6 am, don’t forget about that), leaving other sections of the border unattended and exposing the settlements. Plus, militant drones are destroying communication towers. What follows is chaos.
Let’s see who leads the IDF now.
Herzi Ha-Levi, Chief of the General Staff, Major General, 56 years old. He took office in January of this year. He took part in combat operations in southern Lebanon and the northern part of the Gaza Strip. He led the intelligence department of the General Staff, overseeing the counteraction to the Iranian nuclear program, threats from Syria and ISIS (recognized as terrorist, prohibited). But his main focus was the Gaza Strip.
An important point: as the Israeli media wrote, Ha-Levi’s credo was that it was necessary to avoid confrontation with Hamas and act here, rather, through negotiation and diplomatic methods. The general led the line of development of humanitarian assistance to the Arabs in Gaza.
Well, imagine: reports are coming in about the preparation of a massive attack, but such a forecast contradicts the guidelines developed over the years, in addition, contacts in Hamas convince us of the opposite. Such “I don’t believe” military leaders have happened many times in history.
Next, let’s see what we have with Mossad.
The head of the Israeli intelligence service Mossad is 58-year-old David Barnea. He took up his position in June 2021. Studied in the USA (Master of Business Administration), worked in a bank. Then he entered intelligence and graduated from the military command school in Tel Aviv.
Barnea focused on Iran as the main “mastermind” of Palestinian radicals and Hezbollah. Barnea is credited with developing plans to kill Iranian nuclear scientists, military personnel, and attacks on Iranian facilities. He began to massively use foreign mercenaries as intelligence officers and fighters in order to risk less the lives of Israelis.
Since the beginning of the NWO in Ukraine, in contact with the States, the Mossad’s vector of attention to Iran as an ally of Russia has been focused even more strongly.
The impression is this: while dealing mainly with the “main source of evil” and a risk factor for Israel, Barnea and Co. regarded what was happening directly in Gaza as something of secondary importance. Well, the growing habit of paying mercenaries and sources played a cruel joke – no one canceled the double game.
Newspaper headline:
What did the Mossad look at?
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