Motivation for the special operation

The Andrei Sakharov Foundation and the Memorial Human Rights Center (created to replace the human rights center of the same name, which was liquidated by the court) held an online conference “Russian Realities-2022” over the weekend. This year, the traditional event was entirely devoted to the events around the special military operation (SVO). Political scientists and sociologists who spoke at the conference said that the attitude of Russians to the current events has hardly changed in nine months, although the motivation of those who support the SVO (and they are still the majority) can be very different.

One of the central topics of the two-day discussion was the mood in Russian society after the start of the NWO. Thus, an employee of the Center for Eastern European Studies at the University of Bremen (Germany) Svetlana Erpyleva cited data from 213 sociological interviews: 49 supporters of the special operation, 30 doubters and 134 opponents participated in them, and the experts tried to find out the motivation of each group.

Among the supporters of the NWO, the arguments were divided into “positive” ones (defending the Donbass and Russia from the threats of fascism and the collective West, the idea of ​​getting ahead of the opponent) and more abstract ones (“you need to be with your country, even if it is wrong”, “if the state does this, then , there are reasons known to the president”). Some people support the SVO as if “in spite of”: they say that it would be better if it did not exist, but at the same time they believe that it was inevitable. The apolitical supporters of the SVO are less sure of their position, Ms. Yerpyleva noted. For example, one of the respondents spoke out against the hostilities, but added that the homeland must be supported in any situation: that is, his guilt “combines with pride in his nation,” the expert stated. She also noted that the dissatisfaction caused by partial mobilization did not turn into criticism of the NWO: “The general emotional motive is acceptance and humility, not enthusiasm.”

Sociologist Lyubov Borusyak focused on the critics of the SVO who left and remained in Russia. From April to November, she conducted 200 interviews and 1,800 questionnaires among “educated middle-aged people” (about 70% are residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg). The study showed that the “dissenters” who remained in Russia feel unheard and experience destructive emotions against this background, “many say that“ everything burned out ”, obscene vocabulary appeared in the answers of the intelligent public.” At the same time, “35% of the respondents decided to stay in Russia, and 80% do not accept the idea of ​​collective responsibility,” the sociologist said. 14% of respondents said that they would not leave under any circumstances, citing the lack of money and work abroad, the presence of sick relatives and animals among the reasons for such a decision. Many respondents who remained in Russia noted that the “the worse, the better” approach for their country is unacceptable for them, and in their activities they now focus on various kinds of volunteering. These people see no grounds for decisive political action: self-preservation is more important for them, Ms. Borusyak added.

The scientific director of the Levada Center (included in the register of foreign agents) Lev Gudkov drew attention to the fact that the attitude towards the SVO has changed very little in society over the past nine months. At the end of February, according to Levada, 68% of Russians supported it, in March – 80%, and in October-November – 73-74%. “Among young people, support for the special operation is 62%, while for pensioners it rises to almost 90%. In other words, we see that it is the older groups that are the bearers of this consciousness and set the tone in the socialization of young groups of the population,” explained Mr. Gudkov. On the whole, attention to the events in Ukraine is weakening, especially among young people, and they also have the most pronounced symptom characteristic of the entire Russian society – an almost complete absence of a sense of responsibility and guilt, the sociologist adds.

The participants of the conference also talked about the consequences of the SVO for the Russian society. Thus, political scientist Ekaterina Shulman (included in the register of foreign agents) noted that due to the increase in the number of civil servants and law enforcement officers since 2014, by 2022 a significant part of the middle class began to consist of officials and policemen. This group of the population, according to the expert, benefits from maintaining the existing system, although the media reports that appeared after the start of mobilization about the dismissal of a number of officials from various government agencies could contribute to a change in mood in this class. Political scientist Grigory Golosov, in turn, sees no prerequisites for drastic changes in the political system: according to him, so far none of the ruling groups is interested in democratization, and the ruling class as a whole hopes that the president will cope with the existing problems.

Recall, according to the latest VTsIOM data, the rate of approval of Vladimir Putin’s activities as president from November 28 to December 4 was 74.3%, and the share of positive assessments of the work of the prime minister and the government was 52.7% and 49.1%, respectively. To a direct question about trust in Vladimir Putin, 77.9% of respondents answered positively. As for the attitude of Russians towards the SVO, the last poll on this topic was published by VTsIOM in early September: at that time, 70% of respondents “rather supported” the special operation, 18% “rather did not support it”, and another 12% found it difficult to answer.

Kira Heifetz