Lavrov held talks on the implementation of the declaration on allied cooperation with Baku

The declaration on allied cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan “really works,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said at a February 28 press conference with his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov. This document was signed on February 22, 2022 in Moscow. This declaration defines actions based on mutual agreements, “which are always carried out by both sides,” Lavrov said. He recalled the high intensity of contacts in 2022 at the level of heads of state: there were seven face-to-face meetings between Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev and 12 telephone conversations.

According to Bayramov, the growth in trade between the two countries in 2022 amounted to 24% and reached $4 billion, the volume of mutual investments is about $9 billion, and the freight traffic increased by 22%. The transit of goods through the territory of Azerbaijan to Russia in 2022 increased by about 2.5 times. Bayramov considers the North-South transport corridor to be a particularly important “mega-project” that the two countries are implementing. The number of flights between the two countries has recovered from the pandemic and has reached 135 per week.

A day earlier, Lavrov was received in Baku by President Ilham Aliyev. The Azerbaijani leader noted that the Russian-Azerbaijani declaration on allied cooperation signed a year ago “in practice” reflects the spirit and nature of relations between the two countries. Aliyev expressed hope that 2023 will be a breakthrough year in the normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and will also allow turning the “page of enmity.” The Azerbaijani leader noted the special role of Russia in this process, personally thanking Lavrov.

The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is still stably difficult. Since the beginning of December 2022, Yerevan has been talking about the actual blockade of the Lachin corridor to Karabakh by Azerbaijani activists, as a result of which there is a shortage of essential goods in Armenian settlements. Baku responds with accusations of smuggling weapons through the corridor. On February 18, Azerbaijani President Aliyev proposed to organize a checkpoint on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border in the area of ​​​​the Lachin corridor and the planned Zangezur corridor, which should connect the main Azerbaijani territory with Nakhchivan according to the November 2020 agreements. But the Armenian Foreign Ministry opposed this proposal.

According to Lavrov, the settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations is one of the key topics of his talks in Baku. According to him, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the strict implementation of all the provisions of the statements of the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia dated October 31, 2022 (then they fixed the need to implement the agreements of previous years). “We talked about the course of the negotiation process to unblock transport and economic ties in the South Caucasus. We hope that soon [курирующие международные отношения] Deputy Prime Ministers of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, as co-chairs of the relevant working group, will be able to reach specific agreements on the resumption of the use of the railway route between the main territory of Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan,” Lavrov said.

Bayramov confirmed the discussion with Lavrov of the situation in the South Caucasus. He recalled that Moscow, according to the allied declaration, announced the recognition of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, which, according to him, also implies Baku’s control over Nagorno-Karabakh as its territory within internationally recognized borders. From the Azerbaijani side, “the continued unconstructive position of the Armenian side on the work on the most important document, which is the peace treaty, was noted with regret,” Bayramov said.

“At the end of December [2022 г.] literally a day before the previously agreed meeting in Moscow to discuss the third round of negotiations on the text of the peace agreement, the Armenian side boycotted it and refused to participate,” the Azerbaijani minister lamented, noting that against this background, Yerevan demonstrates its readiness for meetings and discussions of less fundamental issues, but not a peace treaty.

“The root cause of this situation was a gross and repeated violation of the provisions of the tripartite statement, which provides for the purely humanitarian nature of the use of the corridor. The Azerbaijani side has repeatedly pointed out abuses, facts of gross violations by Armenia over the course of two years,” the minister reiterated, noting that, in his opinion, Yerevan shifts responsibility to Moscow and Baku.

Another subject of the negotiations was the situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, which has not been delimited since Soviet times, where the forces of the two countries came into contact in November 2020 and were accompanied by the retreat of the Armenian troops. Mutual shelling and local hostilities have periodically flared up there since May 2021. External forces are trying to resolve the situation. On February 20, 2023, a 100-person EU civilian mission, including unarmed observers, began work on the Armenian side of the border. Prior to this, the CSTO commission visited the border area.

On February 2, 2023, Lavrov stated that the plan for the deployment of CSTO observers is ready and can be implemented within a few days if Armenia agrees. As the Russian minister stated at a press conference on February 28, Moscow and Baku consider it necessary to intensify efforts on the work of the commission on the delimitation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, where Russia will “provide consultative assistance.” Speaking about the EU monitoring mission, Lavrov said that Brussels is abusing relations with Yerevan and Baku, and European efforts to promote this mission raise doubts in terms of legitimacy.

The EU tried to get involved in the settlement process, but without success, notes Stanislav Pritchin, senior researcher at the Center for Post-Soviet Studies at IMEMO RAS: it was after the August summit in Brussels that the most serious aggravation occurred. The dispatch of the EU monitoring mission did not bring peace any closer, since it acts only from the Armenian side, the expert adds.

Russian-Azerbaijani relations have changed over this year, there has been a noticeable cooling, including at the level of assessments in the media and experts, the analyst says. At the same time, trade turnover increased in 2022, and a major contract was signed for the supply of Russian gas to Azerbaijan. And now the positions of Russia and Azerbaijan on the settlement of the Karabakh conflict are closer than ever – both in the Lachin and Nakhichevan corridors, and on the border issue, and on the destructive actions of Western countries, says Pritchin.

Azerbaijan’s positioning in Russian politics and the political elite is connected with the relationship between Putin and Aliyev, said Artur Atayev, head of the Caucasus Studies Sector at the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. Based on their rhetoric, the countries really have developed allied relations, and they are quite actively developing cooperation. According to the level of political and economic ties, Russia is the second partner for Azerbaijan after Turkey, the expert emphasizes. But if we take the perception of Azerbaijan in the context of the Transcaucasus, then the accents change because of the Karabakh problem, adds Ataev.

Baku and Moscow have different views on resolving the consequences of the second Karabakh war in 2020, the expert believes: Russia is trying with all its might to maintain the status of a peacekeeper.