Crimean authorities propose to ban filming of military installations and the consequences of attacks on them

Crimean authorities propose to ban filming of military installations and the consequences of attacks on them

[ad_1]

The Crimean authorities have prepared a bill to punish citizens for publishing information about the location of military installations and their work – for example, about repulsing Ukrainian attacks by air defense forces – and they hope to have it adopted as early as next fall. The head of the republic, Sergei Aksyonov, on Monday proposed extending this ban to photographs and videos demonstrating the “results of terrorist attacks.” In the State Duma, this idea is conceptually supported, but they ask “not to overdo it.” There really is a gap in the current legislation, however, frames with the consequences of strikes are unlikely to be classified as “forbidden” information, the lawyer believes.

“Crimea will initiate at the federal level the introduction of amendments to the legislation in terms of toughening responsibility for the dissemination in the public field, on various Internet resources, in social networks, chats, messengers, of photos and videos of the location and operation of military and strategic facilities, air defense and other defense systems, as well as the results of the terrorist attacks committed by the Kiev regime,” said the head of the republic, Sergei Aksyonov, on August 14. In his opinion, those who do this are free or unwitting accomplices of the enemy in the information war and harm the armed forces of the Russian Federation.

As explained to Kommersant in the State Council (parliament) of Crimea, in early 2023, deputies began preparing a bill on the introduction of a new article in the Code of Administrative Offenses, implying responsibility for disseminating information about the location of military facilities located in the territories of the Russian Federation with a special legal regime (counter-terrorist operation, military position, maximum or average response levels). For such a violation, it was proposed to fine individuals in the amount of 10 thousand to 30 thousand rubles, officials – from 100 thousand to 200 thousand, legal entities – from 300 thousand to 500 thousand rubles. A similar punishment is expected for the publication of information about the locations of air and sea combat ships and engineering and fortifications. The document has already been approved by the Commission of the Council of Legislators on the Integration of New Regions and supported by the Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Black Sea Fleet.

Officially, the project has not yet been submitted to the State Duma, but the Crimeans have already received support in the Duma Committee on Defense, Sergei Trofimov, chairman of the State Council Committee on Legislation, told Kommersant: “Consideration and adoption of relevant changes in the field of administrative punishment is planned for the autumn session.” The deputies are just going to work out Sergei Aksenov’s idea of ​​toughening responsibility. “It is necessary to once again analyze the legislation for loopholes. We will do this and offer the necessary algorithms in the criminal plane. For example, the deliberate issuance of information about the location of military facilities can also lead to treason. Therefore, it is necessary to carefully prescribe the qualifications and circumstances of such acts,” Mr. Trofimov noted. According to him, it is too early to talk about the introduction of liability for the publication of the results of attacks carried out by the Ukrainian army on Russian territory. But in the Crimean government, as a source in the Council of Ministers told Kommersant, they believe that the issue has actually been resolved in Moscow and expect all proposed amendments to be adopted soon.

State Duma deputies from relevant committees interviewed by Kommersant reported that they were unfamiliar with the Crimean project. But, for example, Dmitry Kuznetsov, a member of the defense committee (A Just Russia – For Truth), conceptually supports this idea. He believes that, regardless of the author’s motive, the publication of such materials can play into the hands of the enemy: “There is no need to help enemy gunners find out where our air defense is and how successfully the attack on our territory was carried out.” The prohibition measures are designed to convey to citizens that the publication of information “on air defense and arrivals” helps “to kill more of our people and cause more damage,” the deputy emphasizes: “The main thing is to stay within common sense and not overdo it.” But he is not sure about the expediency of punishment for publishing the obvious consequences of attacks on public places: “If this is Moscow City, where there are a million people around, one may wonder: what does secrecy have to do with it?”

“Any message that goes on social networks is monitored by our enemies, this is a report for them: it arrived – it didn’t arrive, it was shot down – it wasn’t shot down, it was damaged – it wasn’t damaged,” objected Andrey Alshevskikh, a member of the security committee (United Russia). Depending on this, according to him, the enemy can adjust “targets and means of delivery.” And restrictive measures remain the most effective way to stop the distribution of such publications, United Russia is sure: “We need to know and understand what time we live in and what consequences may come from the fact that you decide to hype on social networks.” The deputy also does not rule out that over time, if administrative measures of influence do not work, the mechanisms will have to be tightened up to criminal ones: “But maybe this (administrative punishment.— “b”) will stop many, and then criminal liability will not be needed.” However, this initiative will probably still have to be finalized, Mr. Alshevsky admits: “We still need to prove that these publications influenced something and became material for our enemies in order, for example, to correct strikes – this is the moment, let’s say, debatable”.

Finally, the first deputy chairman of the Committee on Legislation, Yuri Sinelshchikov (KPRF), calls the idea of ​​the Crimean colleagues controversial: “This is not an easy question. If such information reveals all sorts of secrets regarding weapons, then it does not need to be published. Formally, the composition of the misconduct should be seen, but one must proceed from the goal pursued by the person when disseminating this information. And it’s not always obvious.” At the same time, the media are obliged to respond to cases when objects are not sufficiently protected, and it is rather difficult to do this without publishing such materials, the communist adds.

Now shooting military installations and disseminating information about them in the public space is actually unpunished, lawyer Oleg Eliseev confirms. A person who is caught doing such an activity can be warned about the inadmissibility of such actions, but not held accountable. The exception is the transfer of this data to foreign intelligence services or international organizations – such actions are already qualified as treason (Article 275 of the Criminal Code), the expert recalls. But in this case, the intent and the fact that the transfer of these data took place must be proven.

If the Crimean initiative is supported in its current form, then citizens will bear administrative responsibility, even if they simply post a photo of the air defense system on social networks, allowing it to be tied to the area, the lawyer explains. The bill, in his opinion, is designed to protect sensitive information – about the locations of air defense systems, electronic warfare, about the means and methods used by the armed forces. But it is hardly a question of banning the publication of the consequences of any attacks, Mr. Eliseev notes: rather, this measure is aimed at not distributing information about the location of military facilities if they were aimed specifically at them.

Alexander Dremlyugin, Simferopol; Grigory Leiba, Anastasia Kornya, Ksenia Veretennikova

[ad_2]

Source link