What risks arise for Ukraine and Europe due to attacks on gas infrastructure

Since the beginning of hostilities, the main gas infrastructure of Ukraine has been a sacred cow for the Russian leadership. Now the “red line” is in the past – on March 24, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported on missile attacks on “gas production facilities” in western Ukraine. Naftogaz of Ukraine, in turn, reported damage to the equipment of an underground gas storage facility (UGS) in the Lviv region – apparently, we are talking about the largest Bilche-Volitsky underground gas storage facility in Europe with a nominal storage capacity of 17 billion cubic meters.

The extent of the damage is not entirely clear. In general, underground gas storage facilities are extremely difficult to destroy, since they consist of wells hundreds of meters deep through which gas is pumped and withdrawn from the reservoir. However, expensive compressor equipment located on the surface can be damaged, which will make it impossible to extract and inject gas.

Considering the end of the heating season, the direct consequences for Ukraine’s gas supply so far seem minimal, if noticeable at all. A more significant effect may be on the behavior of European gas traders, who, since the fall of 2023, began to store gas in significant volumes in the Bilce-Volicki UGS facility due to low tariffs and proximity to the border with Slovakia. As of October 2023, we were talking about more than 2 billion cubic meters, and in general, the Ukrainian authorities were ready to offer European companies a capacity of up to 12–15 billion cubic meters. The injection season into European underground gas storage facilities could begin in the coming weeks, the EU storage facilities are already half full, and gas has become much cheaper in recent months, so the likelihood of using Ukrainian capacities during the summer was high. Now, however, the risks for companies that decide to store gas in western Ukraine have increased manifold.

If the attacks continue, Ukraine faces risks of gas supply disruptions in the long term. The old logic was that Russia needed a functioning Ukrainian pipeline to supply gas to Europe. However, the gas transit contract expires at the end of the year, and the Ukrainian authorities officially state that they do not intend to renew it. This objectively reduces Moscow’s interest in keeping this infrastructure intact.

Ukraine now does not depend on imported gas, covering its consumption, which has decreased due to hostilities, with its own production. But if the Russian Federation continues attacks on compressor stations, it will become more difficult for Ukraine to maintain continuous gas supply to consumers, especially if the damage is not restored by winter.

However, I am not confident that the threat of such a scenario will be strong enough to, say, stop Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries. If the deterrent effect turns out to be insignificant, striking the Ukrainian gas transportation system itself will be a continuation of a zero-sum game.